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THE NEED FOR A LONG-TERM FEDERAL 
BACKSTOP IN THE TERRORISM INSURANCE 
MARKET* 
INTRODUCTION 
April 31, 2008 arrives as a clear, beautiful day across the U.S. 
Suddenly, Americans’ lives forever change as the U.S. is confronted by its 
second coordinated terrorist attack.1 Terrorists detonate multiple bombs on 
the New York City subway system, reminiscent of the Madrid and London 
subway bombings, and also discharge multiple bombs in Downtown and 
Midtown skyscrapers, all of which collapse. In San Francisco, terrorists 
blow up the largest buildings, including the Transamerica Tower, Bank of 
America and First Interstate Center. Americans and the rest of the world 
watch helplessly as the terrorists execute the worst terrorist attack America 
has ever faced.2 
Unquestionably, such an attack would devastate America, not only in 
terms of lives lost, but also financially. Though there are no official 
estimates as to how much damage would result, considering the number of 
buildings affected, the resulting losses would dwarf those from September 
11th, which amounted to an estimated $32.4 billion in insured losses.3 
Assuming that insurance companies still cover terrorism in their policies, 
such an attack could cause insured losses in the hundreds of billions of 
dollars. Though insurers largely remained solvent after September 11th,4 it 
is questionable whether insurers could remain solvent in the wake of the 
hypothetical attack. In 1999, it was estimated that the insurance industry 
                                                                                                                 
 *  As this note heads to print, the Senate has just passed the Risk Insurance Revision and 
Extension Act of 2007 on November 19, 2007. This proposed legislation, if enacted in its current 
form by the President, will not sunset until December 31, 2014. H.R. 2761, 110th Cong. (2007). 
TRIA and TRIEA, see infra notes 15 & 16, were only three and two year programs respectively. 
The fact that the Senate has approved such a long extension further supports the argument of this 
note: The market cannot currently handle terrorism risk and the federal government should 
provide a long-term federal backstop to the insurance industry. 
 1. See RISK MGMT. SOLUTIONS, INC., A RISK-BASED RATIONALE FOR EXTENDING THE 
TERRORISM RISK INSURANCE ACT 9 (2005), available at http://www.rms.com/Publications/ 
A%20Risk%20Based%20Approach%20for%20Extending%20TRIA.pdf (arguing that terrorists 
are more likely to use coordinated attacks in order to maximize loss and terror, and because 
heightened security will make later attacks less likely in the future). 
 2. This hypothetical situation was taken indirectly from an AIR Worldwide Corporation 
study. AIR compared the estimated insured losses resulting from Anthrax, Sarin gas or car bomb 
attacks in New York City, Washington D.C., San Francisco and Des Moines. Jack Seaquist, Five 
Years After 9/11: How Has Terrorism Risk Management Evolved?, AIRCURRENTS, Sept. 12, 
2006, http://www.air-worldwide.com/_public/html/air_currentsitem.asp?ID=1022. The study 
estimated that a single six-ton truck bomb would cause $12 billion in losses in New York, $6 
billion in losses in Washington D.C., and $9 billion in losses in San Francisco. 
 3. U.S. DEPT. OF THE TREASURY, ASSESSMENT: THE TERRORISM RISK INSURANCE ACT OF 
2002 26 n.24 (2005). 
 4. Robert J. Rhee, Terrorism Risk in a Post-9-11 Economy: The Convergence of Capital 
Markets, Insurance and Government Action, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 435, 463 & n.135 (2005) (“The 
9/11 attacks triggered the liquidation or bankruptcy of only a few troubled insurers.”). 
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could pay out 92.8% of a $100 billion-dollar loss.5 More recently, Standard 
and Poors estimated that aggregate insurance losses would have to surpass 
$50 billion in order to “threaten[] the solvency of the U.S. insurance 
system.”6 Based on these statistics, it seems that the insurance industry 
could not remain viable after an attack of that magnitude. Even those who 
suggest that the insurance industry could sustain a $100 billion loss7 do not 
believe that insurers could sustain multiple large-scale terrorist attacks,8 as 
described above. 
The demise of the insurance industry would in turn have halting effects 
on many other actors and markets. States would deplete their property and 
casualty guaranty funds in order to make policyholders whole.9 
Policyholders, who would become creditors of the insurance companies, 
would have to wait indefinitely for their compensation.10 Because 
businesses would be unable to obtain appropriate insurance, credit ratings 
on their loans would be downgraded.11 Unfortunately, these problems 
would not be localized to New York City and San Francisco, but rather 
would be felt across the nation12 and the world.13 Although the federal 
government would have no affirmative duty to mitigate the insurance 
disaster, having failed to exercise its power to “provide for the common 
                                                                                                                 
 5. See, e.g., Nicos A. Scordis. Financing the Impact of Terrorism: Can Insurers Cope?, 18 
ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 489, 490 n.6 (2003). 
 6. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, FEDERAL REINSURANCE FOR DISASTERS 11 (Sept. 2002) 
[hereinafter CBO]. 
 7. Rhee, supra note 4, at 463 n.136. 
 8. Id. at 440. 
 9. 26 JOHN ALAN APPLEMAN ET AL., APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE §166.1 (2d ed. 2006) 
[hereinafter APPLEMAN]. States create and maintain guaranty associations in which they pool 
money that is put towards paying the claims of insolvent insurers. All fifty states and Puerto Rico 
have enacted laws which require the establishment of these associations. In order for any insurer 
to transact business in a state, they must become members of that association. The associations are 
funded by the participating solvent insurers, who give a portion of their premiums to the 
association. Id. 
 10. Id. at §163.1. “If the policyholder experienced a covered loss prior to the appointment [of a 
receiver, rehabilitator, or liquidator] or adjudication, the insurer remains responsible. The 
applicable insolvency laws will control whether, when and how the policyholder is reimbursed.” 
If, however, the insurer becomes insolvent before the covered loss, the insurer does not have to 
pay the policyholder under the terms of the insurance contract. Id. 
 11. See Joseph B. Treaster, Ratings on Building Loans Fall on Insurance Worries, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 28, 2002, at C5 [hereinafter Ratings on Building]; see also Joseph B. Treaster, 
Insurers Are Ready to Fight to Keep Federal Backing of Terrorism Coverage, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 
29, 2006, at C1 [hereinafter Insurers Are Ready]. 
 12. See, e.g., discussion infra p. 251. See Protecting Americans from Catastrophic Risk; Joint 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Capital Markets, Insurance, and Gov’t Sponsored Enterprises 
and the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the H. Comm. on H. Financial Serv., 109th 
Cong. 131 (2006) [hereinafter Protecting Americans from Catastrophic Risk] (statement of 
Warren Heck, Chairman and C.E.O., Greater New York Mutual Insurance Company) (arguing 
that people would feel the effects of terrorist attacks outside the targets, and that attacks would 
weaken the American economy overall). 
 13. See discussion infra p. 252. 
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Defence and general Welfare of the United States,”14 it likely would 
respond with assistance. In the end, taxpayers across the U.S. would be 
compensating the distant New York City and San Francisco residents and 
businesses. Now imagine the above situation in a world where insurance 
policies excluded terrorism coverage. The insurance companies would 
remain viable, but the other constituents mentioned above would suffer 
even greater financial damage. Businesses would crumble, the federal 
government would have to provide even more financial support, and 
taxpayers would pay for it all. 
However, with a statute similar to the Terrorism Risk Insurance 
Extension Act of 2005 (TRIEA)15 still in place, these fears would be 
substantially alleviated. Assuming that the federal government extends 
TRIEA in its current form, insurance companies, forced to write terrorism 
insurance,16 will only have to pay 20% of their insurer deductible.17 The 
federal government will pay 85%18 of the claim amount exceeding what 
insurers have already paid, and federal compensation will cease once the 
federal government has reached its $100 billion limit.19 Overall, the 
insurance companies would still have to pay significant claims, but could 
remain financially viable. Though the taxpayers may resent the program 
because they do not want to support the insurance companies, as evidenced 
above, taxpayers will have to pay regardless. 
This note argues that the federal government should create a long-term 
federal backstop for terrorism risk coverage. Section I examines the 
insurance industry’s response to September 11th. Section II explains the 
framework of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (TRIA)20 and 
TRIEA. Section III examines why the federal government should create a 
long-term solution to this problem by showing that even with better 
terrorism modeling, terrorism risk is unattractive to insurers and cannot be 
viably insured on the open market. Since the need for terrorism insurance is 
so great and because terrorism coverage will continue to be unattractive to 
insurers, Congress should create a long-term federal backstop to take the 
place of TRIEA. 
                                                                                                                 
 14. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
 15. Terrorism Risk Insurance Extension Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-144, 119 Stat. 2660 
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 6701 note) (2005) [hereinafter TRIEA]. 
 16. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 § 103(a)(3), Pub. L. No. 107-297, 116 Stat. 2322 
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 6701 note) (2002) [hereinafter TRIA] (saying that all entities meeting the 
definition “shall participate in the Program”); id. at §103(c)(1)(B) (insurers may not exclude 
terrorism risk from their policies). 
 17. TRIEA § 3(c)(3)(E) & (F). 
 18. TRIEA § 4. 
 19. TRIA § 103(e)(2)(A). 
 20. TRIA, supra note 16. 
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I.  THE EFFECT OF SEPTEMBER 11TH ON THE INSURANCE 
INDUSTRY 
The U.S. economy suffered greatly after the attacks of September 11th. 
Some have projected that the U.S. economy suffered a $639 billion loss.21 
Furthermore, the attacks caused an estimated $19 billion in property loss.22 
The impact on the insurance industry was equally devastating. One 
insurance executive estimated that insured losses relating to September 11th 
totaled between $30 and $70 billion.23 A $60 million loss would have 
surpassed the property and casualty insurance industry’s income from 1999 
to 2001.24 The U.S. Department of the Treasury estimated that September 
11th resulted in $32.4 billion of insured loss.25 
Although the insurance industry did not collapse as a result of 
September 11th, an examination of the insurance market’s reaction to the 
attacks shows that many insurers struggled. Policyholder surplus26 of all 
property and casualty lines dropped by almost $50 billion from 2000 to 
200127 even though the direct written premiums28 in the property and 
casualty lines rose by about the same amount.29 This means insurers were 
paying more in claims than they had collected in premiums. 
Before September 11th, because insurance companies did not factor in 
the risk associated with terrorism, terrorism coverage was essentially free 
under commercial insurance policies.30 After September 11th, however, 
terrorism insurance was unaffordable or unavailable31 because, among other 
things, many insurance companies decided to exclude the coverage or leave 
the commercial insurance market altogether in order to avoid writing 
                                                                                                                 
 21. Frederic U. Dicker, Stunning Cost of 9/11—U.S. Economy Took A 639B Hit: A NY Study, 
N.Y. POST, Jan. 28, 2002, at 2. 
 22. Scordis, supra note 5, at 493. 
 23. CBO, supra note 6, at 10 n.6. 
 24. Lucien J. Dhooge, A Previously Unimaginable Risk Potential: September 11 and the 
Insurance Industry, 40 AM. BUS. L.J. 687, 689 n.5 (2003). 
 25. U.S. DEPT. OF THE TREASURY, supra note 3, at 26 n.24. 
 26. Surplus is the excess of assets over liabilities. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY WITH 
PRONUNCIATIONS 1443 (6th ed. 1990) [hereinafter BLACK’S]. 
 27. U.S. DEPT. OF THE TREASURY, supra note 3, at 15. 
 28. Id. at 14 (direct written premium is “total premiums collected by insurers directly from 
policyholders for the upcoming period of coverage, before any adjustments for premiums ceded to 
reinsurers.”). 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. at 27 n.28. 
 31. See Michelle E. Boardman, Known Unknowns: The Illusion of Terrorism Insurance, 93 
GEO. L.J. 783, 799 (2005) (quoting Daniel B. Rubock & Tad Philipp, CMBS: Moody’s Approach 
to Terrorism Insurance for U.S. Commercial Real Estate, 489 PLI/REAL EST 365, 367 (2003)); 
see also David Necklaus, Insurance Industry Comes Back Strong in Weeks Since Attack, ST. 
LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Oct. 13, 2001, at 1 (“While they raise their premiums, most insurers are 
reducing their risk. Most new policies specifically exclude coverage of losses caused by 
terrorism.”). 
2007]A Long-Term Federal Backstop in the Terrorism Insurance Market247 
terrorism insurance.32 As a result of the unavailability and/or expense of 
terrorism insurance, many of the New York City landmark buildings had 
inadequate insurance in 2002.33 In turn, credit rating agencies downgraded 
the ratings on at least $4.5 billion of loans on these buildings.34 In addition, 
many construction projects had to be cancelled due to the lack of terrorism 
insurance.35 
Though many insurers bolted from the New York City terrorism risk 
market after September 11th, Greater New York Mutual Insurance 
Company (Greater New York) was an exception to the rule and decided to 
stay.36 According to Warren Heck, chairman and C.E.O. of Greater New 
York, Greater New York swam against the current and remained in the 
market out of a sense of moral obligation.37 To remain viable, Greater New 
York took drastic measures, such as dropping coverage limits from $250 
million to $50 million, decreasing the number of shopping malls covered, 
decreasing workers’ compensation coverage, and expanding coverage 
outside the New York and New Jersey area.38 Unfortunately, by lowering 
coverage limits, Greater New York lost their contracts with many office 
buildings that required more than $50 million in coverage.39 However, even 
having taken these measures to reduce exposure to terrorism, Mr. Heck 
explained that there was “no way for any insurance company, no matter 
how large, to handle the worst case scenario . . . . The government is going 
to have to do something.”40 
The September 11th attacks affected U.S. insurance markets outside 
New York as well.41 In Milwaukee, for example, terrorism risk insurance 
                                                                                                                 
 32. Rick Cornejo, How Greater New York Mutual Stayed in the Terrorism Coverage Game 
Following Sept. 11, BESTWIRE, Sept. 19, 2006. See Joseph B. Treaster, Terror Attacks Often 
Covered By Insurance, A Report Says, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2006, at C6. 
 33. Ratings on Building, supra note 11, at C5. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Terrorism Threats and the Insurance Market: Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Oversight and Investigations of the H. Comm. on Financial Serv. and the Subcomm. on 
Intelligence, Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment of the H. Comm. on Homeland 
Sec., 109th Cong. 34 (2006) [hereinafter Terrorism Threats and the Insurance Market] (statement 
of Jeffrey DeBoer, President and C.E.O. of The Real Estate Roundtable) (“A survey The Real 
Estate Roundtable conducted during the 14 month post 9/11, pre TRIA time period showed that 
more than $15 billion of real estate related transactions had been either stalled or completely 
canceled because of a lack of terrorism insurance.”). 
 36. Cornejo, supra note 32. 
 37. Id. (“We have a lot of insureds that have been with the company for a very long time . . . . 
We owe them something. We don’t feel we can leave them high and dry.”). 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Terrorism Threats and the Insurance Market, supra note 35, at 34 (statement of Jeffrey 
DeBoer, President and C.E.O. of The Real Estate Roundtable). DeBoer stated: 
The interwoven nature of America’s economy, and evidence that terrorism is a threat to 
national economic activity, is demonstrated by these statistics as well as by the 
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comprised approximately 9% of the Milwaukee Brewers baseball stadium’s 
entire budget in 2002 due to September 11th.42 
The effects of September 11th have also even been felt by insurance 
companies who operate outside the U.S. Some foreign insurance companies 
even went bankrupt due in large part to the terrorist attacks.43 Other foreign 
insurance companies began to exclude terrorism coverage from their 
policies in reaction to the attacks of September 11th. QBE Insurance Group, 
an Australia-based insurance company, for example, sustained $252 million 
in losses in 2001, and in 2002 the “majority of its policies . . . exclude[d] 
terrorism cover.”44 Norwich Union Company, which operates in England, 
also began to exclude terrorism coverage after September 11th.45 
Furthermore, Swiss Reinsurance Company cut its terrorism coverage by 
more than half after September 11th.46 
Knowing how the insurance industry reacted to September 11th, 
Congress should take care to prevent a similar situation in the future. An 
attack even larger than September 11th, like the hypothetical coordinated 
attack previously mentioned, would of course have a greater effect on the 
insurance industry. Even with the federal backstop of TRIA in place, 
Greater New York completely restructured its organization to stay in the 
terrorism market after September 11th. Given this and other insurers’ post-
September 11th reactions, it is clear that Congress should create a long-term 
federal backstop to protect the insurance industry in case of future attacks. 
II.  THE LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE 
A. THE TERRORISM RISK INSURANCE ACT OF 2002 
On November 26, 2002, President George W. Bush signed TRIA into 
law.47 In the findings section, Congress noted that the insurance industry 
could respond to September 11th by either excluding terrorism coverage 
                                                                                                                 
anecdotal reports that although the 9/11 attacks occurred in New York and Washington, 
within days, busboys in Seattle and hotel employees in Houston had lost their jobs. 
Id. 
 42. See Don Walker, Terrorism Strains Stadium Budget; Officials Seek Extra $1.4 Million, 
MILWUAKEE J. SENTINEL, Oct. 23, 2003, at 1B (additional terrorism insurance took $250,000 out 
of Miller Park stadium’s $2.78 million budget). 
 43. CBO, supra note 6, at 11 (“Two insurers—one in Denmark, the other in Japan—failed as a 
result of the attacks.”). 
 44. What’s Hot, What’s Not, SUNDAY TEL. (Sydney, Austl.), July 21, 2002, at 101. “QBE 
Insurance Group is Australia’s largest international general insurance & reinsurance group.” QBE 
Insurance Home Page, http://www.qbe.com./Version _2/html/group/QBE_group_entry.html (last 
visited Oct. 23, 2007). 
 45. See Alfred Lee, No Insurance Cover for British Homes: Norwich Union Won’t 
Compensate for Damage, STRAITS TIMES, Jan. 4, 2003, § World. 
 46. See Frances Williams, The Unthinkable Was Insured—This Time, FIN. TIMES (London), 
Sept. 11, 2002, at 12. 
 47. TRIA, supra note 16. 
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from policies or by increasing terrorism risk premiums.48 Congress feared 
this lack of terrorism coverage would stunt property development and 
negatively impact the real estate market as a whole.49 In reaction to these 
worries, the stated purposes of TRIA were to stabilize the terrorism risk 
insurance market50 and to make terrorism insurance more available and 
affordable.51 Unlike a regular insurance policy where the insured pays a 
premium in return for coverage, under TRIA, coverage by the federal 
government was free to insurance companies.  However, under certain 
conditions, the insurance industry was required to repay the federal 
government for its contributions.52 
Through TRIA, the federal government provided a backstop to the 
insurance industry in the form of a reinsurance53 program. Every insurer 
that met the definition of “insurer”54 under TRIA was compelled to 
participate in the program.55 TRIA mandated that insurers were not 
                                                                                                                 
 48. TRIA § 101(a)(5). 
 49. Id. Specifically, Congress worried this response “could seriously hamper ongoing and 
planned construction, property acquisition, and other business projects, generate a dramatic 
increase in rents, and otherwise suppress economic activity . . . .” 
 50. TRIA § 101(b)(2). 
 51. TRIA § 101(b)(1). 
 52. See discussion infra p. 255. 
 53. Reinsurance is “[a] contract that one insurer makes with another to protect the latter from a 
risk already assumed. . . . An agreement to indemnify the assured, partially or altogether, against a 
risk assumed by it in policy issued to third party.” BLACK’S, supra note 26, at 1287–88. 
 54. TRIA § 102(6): 
Insurer—the term ‘insurer’ means any entity, including any affiliate thereof— 
(A) that is— 
licensed or admitted to engage in the business of providing primary or excess 
insurance in any State; 
not licensed or admitted as described in clause (i), if it is an eligible surplus 
line carrier listed on the Quarterly Listing of Alien Insurers of the NAIC, or 
any successor thereto; 
approved for the purpose of offering property and casualty insurance by a 
Federal agency in connection with maritime, energy or aviation activity; 
a State residual market insurance entity or State workers’ compensation fund; 
or 
any other entity described in §103(f) [Captive Insurers and Other Self-
Insurance Arrangements], to the extent provided in the rules of the Secretary 
issued under §103(f). 
(B) that receives direct earned premiums for any type of commercial property and 
casualty insurance coverage, other than in the case of entities described in sections 
103(d) and 103(f); and 
(C) that meets any other criteria that the Secretary may reasonably prescribe. 
Id. 
 55. TRIA § 103(a)(3). 
250 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. [Vol. 2 
permitted to exclude terrorism risk56 from their property and casualty 
policies.57 Any terrorism coverage exclusions found in policies were 
nullified.58 Nevertheless, insurers were permitted to reinstate terrorism 
exclusion provisions that were in place before passage of TRIA if either the 
insurer received written consent from the insured to exclude the coverage, 
or if the insured failed to pay the increased premium for terrorism coverage 
after receiving notice of the escalation.59 Any state’s approval of terrorism 
exclusions was preempted,60 though states were not entirely precluded from 
regulating the terrorism insurance market; they retained the power “to 
invalidate a rate as excessive, inadequate, or unfairly discriminatory.”61 
TRIA was only triggered by an “Act of Terrorism”62 that resulted in 
loss covered by casualty insurance and primary and excess property 
insurance.63 Noticeably absent from the “Act of Terrorism” definition were 
acts of domestic terrorism. Furthermore, to fall under this definition, the 
attack could not be committed in the course of a war declared by Congress, 
and the aggregate property and casualty insurance losses must have 
exceeded $5 million.64 Once that level of loss had been sustained by the 
insurance industry as a whole, the individual insurers were required to pay 
                                                                                                                 
 56. TRIA § 103(c)(1)(B). 
 57. TRIA § 103(c)(1)(A). Property and casualty insurance includes excess insurance, workers’ 
compensation insurance and surety insurance. TRIA § 102(12)(A). 
 58. TRIA § 105(a). 
 59. TRIA § 105(c). 
 60. TRIA § 105(b). 
 61. TRIA § 106(a)(2)(B). 
 62. TRIA § 102(1)(A). The Secretary of the Treasury must certify the attack as an “Act of 
Terrorism” before coverage will take effect. An “Act of Terrorism” is defined as an act that the 
Secretary has certified: 
to be an act of terrorism; 




to have resulted in damage within the United States, or outside the United States in the 
case of 
an air carrier or vessel . . . or 
the premises of a United States mission; and 
(iv) to have been committed by an individual or individual acting on behalf of any 
foreign person or foreign interest, as part of an effort to coerce the civilian population 
of the United States or to influence the policy or affect the conduct of the United States 
Government by coercion. 
TRIA § 102(1)(A)(i)–(iv). 
 63. TRIA § 102(5). 
 64. TRIA § 102(1)(B). 
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their “insurer deductible[s]”65 before federal reinsurance would become 
available to them. After the insurance companies paid their insurer 
deductibles, the federal government would pay 90% of the losses that 
exceeded the insurer deductible that year,66 and the insurer would have to 
pay for the remaining 10%. 
The federal government would not pay more than $100 billion in any 
year under the program.67 Under TRIA, once the government had paid 
insurance companies $100 billion, Congress had the discretion to decide 
how to deal with excess losses.68 Depending on how much financial 
assistance the federal government provided the insurance industry, TRIA 
included provisions providing for mandatory and discretionary recoupment 
for amounts paid.69 By providing insurance companies with the needed 
support in case of a terrorist attack, TRIA stabilized the terrorism insurance 
market. 
B. TERRORISM RISK INSURANCE EXTENSION ACT OF 2005 
Though TRIA was written to sunset on December 31, 2005,70 Congress 
extended this sunset to December 31, 2007 under TRIEA.71 Although most 
of the terms and provisions of TRIEA are essentially the same as those in 
TRIA, there are some significant differences. 
First, TRIEA increases the insurer deductible.72 This means insurers 
must pay out more claims before federal payment kicks in. Second, TRIEA 
reduces the proportion of federal payment in 2007. The federal government 
was still required to pay 90% of insured losses in excess of the insurer 
deductible in 2006, but that amount was reduced to 85% in 2007.73 Third, 
TRIEA increases the recoupment amount so that the insurers are required to 
                                                                                                                 
 65. TRIA § 102(7). To meet its “insurer deductible,” the insurer would have to pay out 1% of 
its direct earned premium in 2002, 7% in 2003, 10% in 2004, and 15% in 2005. TRIA § 
102(7)(A)–(E). Pursuant to the Act, a “direct earned premium” means “a direct earned premium 
for property and casualty insurance issued by an insurer for insurance against losses occurring at 
the locations described in subparagraphs (A) and (B) of paragraph (5) [within the United States or 
to a United States flag vessel].” TRIA § 102(4). See definition of direct earned premium supra 
note 28. 
 66. TRIA § 103(e)(1)(A). 
 67. TRIA § 103(e)(2)(A). 
 68. TRIA § 103(e)(3) (requiring that after the $100-billion mark had been hit, that “Congress 
shall determine the procedures for and the source of any payments for such excess insured loss”). 
 69. TRIA § 103(e)(7). See also Jeffrey Manns, Insuring Against Terror?, 112 YALE L.J. 2509, 
2534 (2003) (citing TRIA §103(e)(7)(A)–(C) and explaining that the recoupment “formula is that 
the Treasury Department must recoup the difference between $10 billion in 2003, $12.5 billion in 
2004, or $15 billion in 2005 and the aggregate of insurers’ uncompensated losses for each year, 
until the government recovers all federal compensation”). However, if aggregate uncompensated 
loss exceeds the “insurance marketplace retention amount,” the insurance industry does not have 
to repay the federal government. TRIA §103(e)(B). 
 70. TRIA §108(a). 
 71. TRIEA § 2(a). 
 72. TRIEA § 3(c)(3)(E) & (F). 
 73. TRIEA § 4(1)(B). 
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pay a higher amount back to the federal government.74 Fourth, whereas the 
TRIA program would take effect for all Acts of Terrorism that resulted in 
$5 million of insured loss, TRIEA sharply increases the program trigger to 
$50 million in 2006 and $100 million in 2007.75 Overall, the TRIEA 
provides less federal assistance to the insurance industry than provided 
under TRIA. 
III. PREPARING FOR THE TRIEA SUNSET, CONGRESS SHOULD 
CREATE A LONG-TERM FEDERAL BACKSTOP 
Faced with the pending sunset on December 31, 2007,76 Congress must 
decide whether they want a TRIEA-esque program at all, and if so, in what 
form. Some believe that extension is unlikely,77 while others are confident 
that the federal government will continue to provide a backstop in some 
form.78 With the Democrats holding a majority in both the House and 
Senate, it is even more likely that Congress will extend TRIEA in some 
form.79 Congress has many options, including allowing TRIEA to sunset 
and leaving the task of insuring terror to the market, extending TRIEA in its 
current or in a similar form for a short period as before, or creating a long-
term federal backstop for terrorism risk insurance. Since only the federal 
government can effectively support the terrorism insurance industry and the 
problems associated with terrorism insurance will not change in the near 
future, Congress should create a long-term federal backstop. 
A. LEAVING TERRORISM INSURANCE TO THE MARKET PROVIDES 
NO SOLUTION AT ALL 
The consequences of leaving the terrorism risk insurance problem to the 
market are unavoidable. Before Congress decided to extend TRIA in 2005, 
concerned insurers quickly sought to raise premium prices in high-risk 
industries,80 and there is no reason to think this will not happen again in 
                                                                                                                 
 74. TRIEA § 5. 
 75. TRIEA § 6. 
 76. TRIEA § 2(a). 
 77. Mark A. Hofmann, Plan Seeks Federal Cover for Costliest Terror Risk, BUS. INS., Aug. 
23, 2006, § NEWS, at 1. 
 78. Rob Wells & Damian Paletta, Hartford CEO: US Congress Likely To Renew Terror 
Insurance, DOW JONES NEWSWIRE, Oct. 3, 2006 (quoting Ramani Ayer, head of Hartford 
Financial Services Group, who had “reasonable confidence that this bill, some legislation, will get 
enacted to respond to the risk of terrorism”). 
 79. Three hundred and seventy-one House members voted for the passage of TRIEA, while 
forty-nine voted against it, and of all those who voted, a greater proportion of Democrats voted for 
TRIEA’s passage. One hundred and ninety-two to three Democrats voted in favor of TRIEA, 
while only 178 Republicans voted for it and 46 voted against it. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act 
Voting Record, CONG. REC. S467, 612 (daily ed. Dec. 7, 2005). 
 80. See Protecting Americans from Catastrophic Risk, supra note 12, at 93 (statement of 
Gregory Case, President and C.E.O. of Aon Corporation). Case explained: 
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2007. In fact, with the 2007 sunset approaching, insurers have written 
“springing exclusions” into their new policies, automatically voiding 
terrorism coverage should Congress allow TRIEA to sunset.81 The largest 
risk inherent in the private market solution is that insurers will decide to 
abandon terrorism insurance altogether, and as shown by the springing 
exclusions already in place, this is almost a certainty. 
Congress should not leave the problem of terrorism insurance to be 
solved by the private market for many other reasons as well. First, insurers 
cannot effectively assess terrorism risk. Second, even with better risk 
models, terrorism insurance is unattractive to insurers, and insurers will 
choose to quit the market if allowed. Third, the absence of terrorism 
insurance would stifle certain desirable economic activities. Finally, even if 
states were to require insurers to provide affordable terrorism insurance, 
state regulation in the absence of TRIEA would create an unattractive 
terrorism insurance market. 
1. Insurance Companies Cannot Effectively Price Their Policies 
Because the Threat of Terrorism Remains Unpredictable 
Before an insurance company determines a policy premium, it assesses 
the risk involved.82 Using actuarial tables reflecting both the frequency of 
occurrence of a given risk and the cost of the resulting damage,83 insurers 
calculate a corresponding premium price. Though accurate actuarial data is 
available for natural disasters and ordinary losses, the same information is 
not available for terrorism.84 One commentator argued that due to the 
“short, uneven history of terrorism within the United States,”85 no 
                                                                                                                 
We don’t have to guess what the post TRIA market will look like if the TRIA program 
is allowed to lapse unrenewed at the end of 2007. Renewal activity in the latter half of 
2005—before TRIA was extended—as well as pre-2002 TRIA provides a clear 
roadmap. According to industry reports, during late 2005 . . . [for] insureds in areas 
with high concentrations of risk (generally urban areas), in high-risk industries, or 
properties perceived as “targets,” capacity was low and prices were high. This is also 
true of large insureds seeking large amounts of terror coverage. 
Id. 
 81. Terrorism Threats and the Insurance Market, supra note 35, at 36 (statement of Jeffrey 
DeBoer, President and C.E.O. of The Real Estate Roundtable); Denise Trowbridge, Future of 
Terrorism Insurance is at Risk: Law that Caps Losses, Helps Fund Policies Will Expire in ‘07, 
COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Nov. 26, 2006, § BUSINESS, at 1F. 
 82. See KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, INSURANCE LAW AND REGULATION 4 (4th ed. 2005). 
 83. Mark Boran, To Insure or Not to Insure, That Is the Question: Congress’ Attempt to 
Bolster the Insurance Industry After the Attacks on September 11, 2001, 17 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL 
COMMENT. 523, 532–33 (2003). 
 84. Boardman, supra note 31, at 815 (“Scientific data is not a candidate with terrorism, nor is 
history a guide.”). 
 85. Id. 
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“meaningful [actuarial tables can] be created.”86 As a result, terrorism risk 
cannot be insured due in large part to the lack of effective risk calculation.87 
Nevertheless, AIR Worldwide88 launched the world’s first terrorism-
loss estimation model in September 2002.89 This model estimates the 
“location, frequency and severity” of possible terrorist attacks.90 Since there 
is limited historical data on terrorist attacks, AIR Worldwide assembled an 
experienced team of counter-terrorism experts to assist in the modeling.91 
Risk Management Solutions, Inc. (RMS), another risk modeling service, 
released a similar model of terrorism risk in 2002.92 Even though insurers 
have these risk models at their disposal, they are not convinced that the 
models are effective. Years after the release of these terrorism models, the 
insurers who use them are still complaining that terrorism risk cannot be 
properly assessed.93 Furthermore, academics have described the risk models 
as “educated guesses of individual people, or, at a minimum, the 
aggregation of subjective data.”94 Even with the advances in risk modeling, 
the models seem far from accurate, making pricing of terrorism risk 
insurance policies impossible. 
                                                                                                                 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 784 (“[I]n the absence of meaningful actuarial data on the risk of international 
terrorism in the United States, insurance coverage is not possible.”). Boardman also argues that 
this risk cannot be covered because it “may be too correlated or catastrophic for effective risk 
pooling.” Id. 
 88. Quantifying the Risk from Terrorist Attacks, http://www.air-worldwide.com/_public/ 
html/terrorism.asp (last visited Nov. 21, 2006). According to its website, AIR Worldwide is “the 
world’s premium risk modeler and technology firm specializing in risks associated with natural 
and man-made catastrophes, weather and climate.”  About AIR, http://www.air-
worldwide.com/_public/html/about_air.asp (last visited Nov. 21, 2006). 
 89. Quantifying the Risk from Terrorist Attacks, supra note 88. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Terrorism Threats and the Insurance Market, supra note 35, at 71 (statement of Peter 
Ulrich, Senior Vice President of Risk Management Solutions, Inc.). 
 93. See Protecting Americans from Catastrophic Risk, supra note 12, at 128 (statement of 
Warren Heck, Chairman and C.E.O., Greater New York Mutual Insurance Company) (arguing 
that there is an “inescapable fact that terrorism insurance is a classic uninsurable risk. . . . When it 
comes to terrorism risk insurance, we have no basis for estimating frequency. . . . They cannot tell 
us when or where it might occur or its likely nature. Harder still from an insurance perspective, we 
cannot predict its severity.”). According to Gregory Case: 
Since [2002] . . . it has become clear that the private sector—insurance companies, 
capital markets and rating agencies—have a very limited ability to insure and rate 
terrorism risks that are only questionably quantifiable, totally unpredictable and, thus, 
essentially impossible to underwrite. . . . Because of the unique characteristics of 
terrorism risk—unpredictability, the political dynamic, the catastrophic nature of the 
losses—any workable solution must involve the federal government. 
Id. at 90, 94 (statement of Gregory Case, President and CEO, AON Corp.). Note that this 
congressional hearing took place in 2006, years after the risk models were released. 
 94. Boardman, supra note 31, at 818–19. 
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2. Even With More Accurate Terrorism Risk Models, 
Terrorism Coverage Remains Unattractive to Insurers in 
the Private Market 
Despite these improvements in modeling, terrorism risk remains largely 
uninsurable on the open market.95 Even risk modelers support the extension 
of TRIEA. Peter Ulrich, RMS’s Senior Vice President, urged Congress to 
extend TRIEA, arguing that even with improved terrorism risk models, 
large-scale terrorist attacks will lead the “large majority of insurers to quit 
the terrorism market.”96 
It is not simply imperfection in modeling that makes terrorism 
unattractive to insurers; it is the sheer enormity of loss that could result 
from terrorist attacks that sends insurers running. As stated by Warren 
Heck, “damages [from large-scale terrorist attacks] could reach into the 
hundreds of billions, levels that only the federal government can afford to 
pay.”97 He went on to say: 
Absent a terrorism insurance program, a $778 billion terrorist event[,] the 
high estimate for a single terrorist event by the American Academy of 
Actuaries in New York City[,] would wipe out more than the total 
property/casualty insurance industry surplus for all lines, estimated at 
$414 billion as of September 30, 2005 by the Insurance Information 
Institute. This would mean that the industry would be unable to meet its 
obligations to its other insureds for the many different coverages beyond 
terrorism insurance protected by that surplus.98 
The insurers would either become insolvent or unable to pay claims.99 
Faced with the possibility of such large losses, the private market of 
                                                                                                                 
 95. See supra note 93. If terrorism insurance were on the free market, insurers would not write 
it. See discussion of the insurance industry post-September 11th, supra p. 250. 
 96. Terrorism Threats and the Insurance Market, supra note 35, at 79 (statement of Peter 
Ulrich, Senior Vice President of Risk Management Solutions, Inc.) (testifying that “[a] major 
benefit of having TRIA in place is it has allowed key sectors of the economy to return to ‘business 
as usual’”). 
 97. Protecting Americans from Catastrophic Risk, supra note 12, at 128 (statement of Warren 
Heck, Chairman and C.E.O., Greater New York Mutual Insurance Company). See Five Years 
After 9/11: How Has Terrorism Risk Management Evolved?, supra note 2 (estimating insured 
losses resulting from truck bombs, medium scale chemical, nuclear and biological attacks and 
large scale chemical, nuclear and biological attacks); see also Cornejo, supra note 32 (“There is 
no way for any insurance company, no matter how large, to handle the worst case scenario . . . . 
The government is going to have to do something.”). 
 98. Protecting Americans from Catastrophic Risk, supra note 12, at 129 (statement of Warren 
Heck, Chairman and C.E.O., Greater New York Mutual Insurance Company). See also Five Years 
After 9/11: How Has Terrorism Risk Management Evolved?, supra note 2. 
 99. Protecting Americans from Catastrophic Risk, supra note 12, at 129 (statement of Warren 
Heck, Chairman and C.E.O., Greater New York Mutual Insurance Company) (“[T]he private 
market cannot cover events of such magnitude without either bankrupting insurers and reinsurers 
or wiping out so much insurer surplus that they could not meet their obligations on other lines of 
insurers . . . .”). 
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terrorism insurance would not be able to protect itself through better 
modeling.100 
Though TRIEA opponents believe that terrorism insurance should be 
left to the private insurance market,101 realistically, terrorism cannot viably 
be insured on the open market.102 Esteemed risk-analysis experts agree with 
this conclusion. Moody’s Investor Services,103 for example, does not 
believe “private market initiatives” could replace TRIA.104 Moody’s 
believes that TRIA provides good “solvency protection,” that without 
TRIA, private reinsurers “are unlikely to fill the void left by” TRIA, and 
that primary insurers will consequently leave the insurance market.105 
Furthermore, although capital markets can play a role in the terrorism 
insurance market, RMS believes they are “unlikely to provide the bulk of 
the capacity needed.”106 Some suggest that catastrophe bonds could help fill 
the void should Congress allow TRIEA to expire.107 When insurance 
companies issue catastrophe bonds, they promise to repay the investor’s 
loans with interest, unless the specified catastrophe occurs, in which case 
the loan is partly or fully forgiven.108 Though catastrophe bonds provide a 
good source of risk capacity, they cannot transfer enough risk away from 
insurers to replace TRIEA.109 
                                                                                                                 
 100. Id. at 129 (statement of Warren Heck, Chairman and C.E.O., Greater New York Mutual 
Insurance Company); See also Five Years After 9/11: How Has Terrorism Risk Management 
Evolved?, supra note 2. 
 101. See Manns, supra note 69, at 2513 (“Law and Economics Scholars have repeatedly made 
arguments against government interventions in insurance markets, relying on solid empirical 
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suggested the extension of TRIA will disrupt or delay the development of a solution by the 
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 102. Terrorism Threats and the Insurance Market, supra note 35, at 35 (statement of Jeffrey 
DeBoer, President and C.E.O. of The Real Estate Roundtable) (saying that it is “highly 
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 103. “Moody’s Investors Service is among the world’s most respected, widely utilized sources 
for credit ratings, research and risk analysis.” About Moodys, http://www.moodys.com/moodys/ 
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asp (last visited Nov. 19, 2007). 
 104. Terrorism Threats and the Insurance Market, supra note 35, at 35 (statement of Jeffrey 
DeBoer, President and C.E.O. of The Real Estate Roundtable). 
 105. JAMES ECK, TERRORISM RISK REMAINS MATERIAL FOR INSURERS AS TRIA EXPIRATION 
LOOMS 5 (2005), available at http://www.insureagainstterrorism.org/pdf/Terrorism%20Risk% 
20Remains%20Material%20for%20Insurers.pdf. 
 106. RISK MGMT. SOLUTIONS, INC., supra note 1, at 17. 
 107. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, FEDERAL TERRORISM REINSURANCE: AN UPDATE 5 (Jan. 2005). 
 108. Id. at Appendix B. 
 109. RISK MGMT. SOLUTIONS, INC., supra note 1, at 17. 
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3. The Need for Terrorism Insurance 
Despite the fact that writing terrorism insurance is unattractive to 
insurers, terrorism coverage is necessary in today’s world. Since the 
creation of the Homeland Security Advisory System110 in 2002,111 the 
terrorism threat level has never rated below yellow.112 A threat level of 
yellow means that there is “significant risk of a terrorist attack.”113 
Furthermore, the Department of Homeland Security had raised the threat 
level from yellow to orange nationwide on five separate occasions,114 
meaning that there was a “high risk of terrorist attacks.”115 After 
intercepting a serious threat that passengers would carry explosives onto a 
plane traveling from the United Kingdom to the U.S., the Secretary of 
Homeland Security raised the threat level to red,116 which means 
“severe.”117 In short, the U.S. has been on constant guard since September 
11th, and this will continue in the future.118 President Bush has told 
Americans that it is not a question of whether America will face another 
terrorist attack, but rather a question of when.119 In light of this constant 
threat, insurance companies and the federal government need to take 
                                                                                                                 
 110. Homeland Security Advisory System, http://www.dhs.gov/xinfoshare/programs/Copy_ 
of_press_release_0046.shtm (last visited Nov. 21, 2006). 
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July 13, 2004, at A2. 
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id. at 3 (statement of Christopher Shays, U.S. Representative). 
 115. Homeland Security Advisory System, supra note 110. 
 116. See Threat Level Change for Aviation Sector, U.S. FED. NEWS, Aug. 10, 2006; Stephen 
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Chronology, supra note 112. 
 117. Homeland Security Advisory System, supra note 110. 
 118. RISK MGMT. SOLUTIONS, INC., supra note 1, at 1, 6–7 (suggesting terrorists are committed 
to complete another terrorist attack on U.S. soil and also noting that the frequency of terrorist 
attacks has increased since September 11th); Terrorism Threats and the Insurance Market, supra 
note 35, at 79 (statement of Peter Ulrich, Senior Vice President of Risk Management Solutions, 
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 119. Protecting Americans from Catastrophic Risk, supra note 12, at 128 (statement of Warren 
Heck, Chairman and C.E.O., Greater New York Mutual Insurance Company) (“President Bush 
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affirmative steps to protect the economy from the effects of another 
attack.120 
Also because of this ongoing threat, real estate and construction 
businesses are now often required to obtain terrorism insurance in order to 
receive loans from banks and other lenders.121 Without terrorism coverage, 
ratings on commercial mortgage loans will default or be downgraded122 
because lenders will not want to loan money to these underinsured 
businesses. Terrorism coverage is therefore essential to the economy.123 
Some, however, believe that TRIEA creates perverse incentives—they 
argue that a restriction on certain economic activities is necessary and that 
with the protection of terrorism insurance, people will be confronted with a 
“moral hazard” and take less care to minimize their own exposure to 
terrorist attacks.124 People could reduce their risk by relocating to areas that 
are less likely to be a target,125 and perhaps the existence of TRIEA stops 
people from taking such precautions. However, others argue that businesses 
should engage in risky behavior,126 and without terrorism insurance they are 
                                                                                                                 
 120. Id. at 86 (statement of Ramani Ayer, Chairman, President and C.E.O. of The Hartford 
Financial Services Group). Ayer believes: 
[A]s long as this terrible risk threatens our way of life, we need to have a way to  
fortify our economy against it. The insurance industry is willing to play an integral role 
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 121. Insurers Are Ready, supra note 11, at C1. 
 122. Terrorism Threats and the Insurance Market, supra note 35, at 35 (statement of Jeffrey 
DeBoer, President and C.E.O. of The Real Estate Roundtable). 
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President and C.E.O. of Aon Corporation). 
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Reaction to September 11, 49 LOY. L. REV. 997, 1017–20 (2003); Manns, supra note 69, at 2536–
37. But see Terrorism Threats and the Insurance Market, supra note 35, at 32 (statement of 
Jeffrey De Boer, President and C.E.O. of The Real Estate Rountable) (“We share the view that the 
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vast sums on various mitigation activities . . . nationally on terror related risks, vulnerabilities and 
mitigation strategies with government at all levels.”). 
 125. See generally Darius Lakdawalla & George Zanjani, Terrorism Insurance Policy and the 
Public Good, 18 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 463, 467 (2003) (noting that “[s]elf-protection 
against terrorism includes more subtle behavioral changes such as making decisions about where 
to live, where to locate an office-building project, or where to go for entertainment on a Saturday 
night”). 
 126. See id. at 466; see also Protecting Americans from Catastrophic Risk, supra note 12, at 
89–90 (statement of Gregory Case, President and C.E.O. of Aon Corporation) (“Because 
insurance provides individuals and businesses with the ability to take the risks that are essential to 
the functioning of our economy, constraining that ability would be economically devastating. 
TRIA has prevented that from happening.”). 
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less likely to do so. As Darius Lakadawella and George Zanjani noted in 
their paper Terrorism Insurance Policy and the Public Good, “TRIA’s 
potential encouragement of risk-taking behavior was in fact a key 
underlying motivation, rather than a worrisome side-effect.”127 That is, we 
want businesses to occupy the Empire State Building and other prominent 
Manhattan buildings even though it may be risky. Furthermore, critics who 
worry about the “moral hazard” seem to ignore the fact that insurers are still 
required to pay potentially huge losses under TRIEA,128 and therefore have 
great incentive to make policyholders minimize their risks.129 Insureds may 
somewhat reduce their exposure to terrorism risk by investing in better 
security systems and by moving to safer locations.130 However, those who 
worry about the “moral hazard” also seem to forget that there is only so 
much the insured can do to limit its exposure. The federal government alone 
is most capable of minimizing the U.S.’s exposure to terrorist attacks.131 
Finally, and most importantly, these critics overlook the fact that human 
lives are the most significant loss in any terrorist attack. Regardless of the 
money, policyholders will take care to ensure their own survival. 
4. State Regulation Cannot Solve the Problem 
Before the passage of TRIA, terrorism insurance was largely 
unregulated, so insurers could decide for themselves the cost of doing 
business.132 In fact, only New York, California, Florida, Georgia and Texas 
regulated terrorism insurance before September 11th.133 As a result of this 
lack of regulation, many insurers chose to exclude terrorism from their 
policies, deciding they did not want to be in that line of business at all.134 
Those that did not exclude terrorism coverage from their policies did not 
factor that risk into their premium calculus and essentially provided the 
coverage free of charge.135 After September 11th and before the TRIA 
became effective, forty-five states allowed insurers to exclude terrorism 
coverage.136 Some states, however, went against this trend and prohibited 
insurance companies from excluding terrorism coverage from their 
policies.137 In Florida, for example, the state insurance department refused 
                                                                                                                 
 127. Lakdawalla & Zanjani, supra note 125, at 468. 
 128. TRIEA §§ 3(c)(3)(E)–(F), 4. See infra note 163. 
 129. Alan Wirzbicki, Lawmakers Study Terror Insurance Renewal, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 27, 
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260 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. [Vol. 2 
to allow terrorism exclusions after September 11th, despite the possibility 
that certain insurers could be priced out of the market.138 
Should TRIEA lapse, one way to keep terrorism insurance affordable 
and available would be through state regulation. States could require 
insurers to provide coverage for terrorism risk, but this solution presents 
further difficulties.139 Under their police powers, states now have the 
“unquestioned power” to regulate insurers,140 and may do so without 
compensating the insurers who have no choice but to write the regulated 
insurance.  In order to keep insurance affordable and available, which was 
one of the stated purposes of TRIA,141 state regulators could determine the 
price of writing terrorism insurance.142 Should insurance companies decide 
to raise terrorism risk insurance premiums, in most states, they would first 
need permission from the state regulator,143 who could decline all rates that 
are “excessive, inadequate or unfairly discriminatory.”144 
In a world without TRIEA, however, state involvement alone could not 
solve the problem. In fact, RMS believes that state regulation actually 
“hinder[s]” the terrorism insurance market, and suggests that state 
regulation will cause insurers to leave the terrorism market.145 Under the 
TRIEA regime where the federal government requires insurers to provide 
coverage, the federal government will compensate insurers in the event of 
an attack as the price for making them provide terrorism coverage. States 
could not realistically compel insurers to provide terrorism coverage at their 
required prices without giving the insurers any compensation. Since the 
insurers would be unable to use their usual coping mechanism of increasing 
premiums or excluding coverage to remain profitable,146 they would in turn 
be forced to do business at artificially low rates, and would thus lose 
money.147 Though state regulation would protect the insured in the short run 
                                                                                                                 
 138. Id. (reinsurers threatened primary insurers that they would drop coverage unless the state 
regulators allowed terrorism exemptions). 
 139. See, e.g., Protecting Americans from Catastrophic Risk, supra note 12, at 129 (statement 
of Warren Heck, Chairman and C.E.O., Greater New York Mutual Insurance Company) (“State 
laws prohibit workers’ compensation policies from excluding terrorism related losses, thus leaving 
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 140. APPLEMAN, supra note 9, at §169.1[A]. 
 141. TRIA § 101(b)(1). 
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 143. See J. David Cummins & Mary A. Weiss, Regulation and the Automobile Insurance 
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 144. See id. 
 145. RISK MGMT. SOLUTIONS, INC., supra note 1, at 20. 
 146. CBO, supra note 6, at 9. 
 147. Cummins & Weiss, supra note 143. State regulation of car insurance has caused “market 
failure” in at least New Jersey and Massachusetts. As discussed in the article “Regulation and the 
Automobile Insurance Crisis,” insurance costs are high in both New Jersey and Massachusetts due 
in large part to high accident rates. As a result of soaring premiums, these states commenced 
“strict prior approval rate regulation,” which in turn made “auto insurance unprofitable for the 
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by keeping insurance affordable, in the long term, the regulators could price 
private insurance companies out of the terrorism market148 and leave the 
insured with no terrorism coverage at all. 
B. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT ALONE CAN SOLVE THE PROBLEM 
As previously discussed, with loss estimates resulting from the 
hypothetical attack in the hundreds of billions of dollars, the federal 
government would have to support the insurance companies in the absence 
of TRIEA.149 Without the support of the federal government, insurers would 
not be able to pay their claims.150 Furthermore, the federal government 
provides enormous support to affected people after natural catastrophes and 
should do likewise after a terrorist attack.151 Having failed to protect the 
country for which Congress has a duty,152 Congress should have an 
affirmative duty to provide for its citizens after an attack. As Warren Heck 
explained at the Congressional hearing relating to the extension of TRIEA: 
[T]he issue before Congress is not whether the government will be the 
insurer of last resort in the event of such an attack, but rather whether the 
government will work with the insurance industry to thoughtfully and 
deliberately develop a plan to maximize private sector coverage of the 
massive damages that will result before an attack, rather than reacting in 
crisis mode after an attack occurs. Better TRIA than FEMA.153 
In other words, the federal government will have to support the insurance 
industry in some form, and it is far better to be proactive rather than 
reactive. 
Furthermore, TRIEA’s current effect on the insurance industry 
demonstrates its success and supports an extension of the Act. In the 
voluminous Report to Congress in which the Treasury Department assessed 
TRIA, the Treasury Department documented growth in insurer financial 
capacity during the TRIA years, and specifically pointed to the increase of 
policyholder surplus since the enactment of TRIA.154 An increase in 
policyholder surplus means that an insurer is better able to pay its claims.155 
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Company). 
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In fact, surplus was higher in 2004 than it was immediately before 
September 11th.156 In addition, terrorism insurance policy take-up rates 
increased at least 40% since TRIA’s inception, and premiums have 
dropped.157 In the Midwest and Southwest, where terrorist attacks are less 
likely than in locations like New York City,158 take-up rates increased 
35%.159 It makes little sense to abandon a program that has proven to have 
done its job so effectively. 
On the other hand, critics of TRIEA complain that the Act is a form of 
corporate welfare and that the insurance industry should not be given this 
extra support.160 However, these critics overlook the fact that in 2007, 
TRIEA is only triggered by an act of terrorism that results in at least $100 
million in insured losses.161 The federal government has not paid insurers a 
single dollar since the inception of the backstop.162 Furthermore, the federal 
government only compensates insurers after insurers have already paid out 
a large portion of their deductibles.163 In fact, RMS estimated that “in over 
90% of attacks, the industry pays the majority of loss.”164 TRIEA is really 
meant for a worst case scenario.165 TRIEA only provides essential support 
and is not a means for the insurance industry to get rich. 
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C. CONGRESS SHOULD CREATE A LONG-TERM BACKSTOP 
MODELED AFTER TRIEA 
As previously discussed, there are many reasons why insurers would 
want to quit the market in the absence of TRIEA. Terrorism is essentially 
an uninsurable risk166 that needs to be insured. First and foremost, terrorism 
is uninsurable because it is unpredictable. Unfortunately, the only real way 
for terrorism to become more predictable is for terrorists to launch more 
attacks, for you can only truly discern an accurate pattern with multiple data 
points.167 However, even if modelers could predict the future, it does not 
necessarily follow that insurers will want to cover terrorism risk of their 
own volition. Perhaps a truly precise prediction of future terrorist attacks 
would make insurers even more hesitant to write the coverage. If insurers 
were allowed to exclude coverage, the abandonment would in turn have 
stifling effects on the economy, specifically on the development of the real 
estate market.168 
It is clear that TRIEA should be extended in some form. Even former 
Secretary of the Treasury John W. Snow,169 who opposes the extension of 
TRIEA believing that it hinders the development of a private market for 
terrorism insurance,170 predicted negative consequences of allowing TRIEA 
to sunset. Specifically, Secretary Snow believes that after TRIEA expires, 
insurers will either exclude terrorism from their policies or increase 
premiums on terrorism coverage.171 In fact, Christopher Timm, president of 
Century Insurance Group admits that “[t]he only reason we offer [terrorism 
insurance] now is because we have to under this law.”172 If TRIEA expires, 
there is little question that insurance companies will abandon the terrorism 
market. The whole purpose of the Act was to make terrorism coverage 
affordable and available.173 With Secretary Snow’s predictions, Mr. Timm’s 
frank statement, and in the face of a constant terrorist threat,174 it seems 
foolish to allow the Act to sunset. Rather than allow TRIEA to do so, 
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Congress should create a long-term solution to the terrorism coverage 
problem.175 
So far, Congress has had to re-visit the terrorism insurance issue every 
two years, arguably a great waste of its time. Terrorism will continue to 
threaten the U.S., and terrorism coverage will continue to be unattractive to 
insurers.176 Ben Tucker, Vice President of national property insurance for 
Marsh USA, believes “[i]t will take at least [ten] more years for the 
insurance market to be able to handle the risk.”177 Therefore, reevaluations 
every two years make little sense. 
Not only has Congress had to re-confront the issue every two years, so 
have insurance companies. Since TRIA’s inception, insurers have been 
preparing for the sunset. Perhaps if insurance companies had spent their 
time with TRIA and TRIEA coverage focused solely on the development of 
the terrorism insurance market rather than on preparation for a looming 
sunset, the market would be even stronger today. A long-term federal 
backstop may well dispel panic and provide comfort to insurance 
companies and, contrary to Secretary Snow’s belief, actually help the 
development of a private market. If the private market grows stronger, then 
Congress can always amend the legislation and slowly lower federal 
involvement. 
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The backstop should be long-term but not set in stone. As insurers’ 
capacities grow, Congress can raise insurer deductibles and lower federal 
payment so that TRIEA continues to accomplish its goals of stabilizing the 
private market and keeping coverage affordable and available,178 while not 
passing into the territory of government subsidy.179 Having seen that a cold-
turkey approach simply will not work, as evidenced by the existence of 
springing exclusions, Congress should adapt and rather wean the insurance 
companies from their essential crutch. 
CONCLUSION 
If left to their own devices, insurance companies will exclude terrorism 
coverage from their policies. Not only have insurers admitted they are only 
in the terrorism market because TRIEA forces them to be, empirical 
evidence also shows that insurers prepared to increase premium prices as 
the TRIA sunset approached, and are now writing automatic exclusions into 
their policies as the TRIEA sunset draws near. Though some insurers, like 
Greater New York, feel a sense of moral obligation to stay in the terrorism 
insurance market, Greater New York is the exception to the rule. There will 
be heavy ramifications if insurers are allowed to leave the market 
altogether, and likewise, there will be negative consequences if insurers are 
forced to remain in the market without the possibility of federal 
compensation.  The only viable option is for the government to stay its 
present course, forcing insurers to write terrorism coverage while providing 
compensation for making them do so. The terrorist threat will not go away 
in the foreseeable future. As long as the U.S. remains a world leader, there 
will be others who will want to see its demise. Therefore, the federal 
government should create a continuing solution to deal with the continuing 
problem. 
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